Aspect 2019 - Conference Day 2
- 24 okt 2019
- 43 minuten om te lezen
Performance
Felix Schmid, University of Birmingham
Closer running: magic capacity potion or poison?
Felix Schmid was born in Zürich, Switzerland, where he attended the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. He graduated with a degree in electrical and electronic engineering, specialising in power and control systems. He worked in Switzerland for two years, as a computer systems analyst, and then moved to Manchester, England, where he worked as a locomotive control engineer with GEC Traction (now part of Alstom) for three and a half years. For the following three years he was a research assistant at UMIST (now part of Manchester University), working in very low current electronics, and at Salford University, where he designed and built machine tools. He became a lecturer at Brunel University in 1985 and taught control engineering and computer integrated manufacturing, before being seconded to the Swiss Federal Office of Transport, as a railway signalling inspector. Felix joined the University of Sheffield in 1994, tasked with creating the MSc programme in Railway Systems Engineering. He moved to the Birmingham Centre for Railway Research and Education at the University of Birmingham in 2005, where he became director of education. He established research in railway capacity and railway safety. Prof Schmid is a Fellow of the IRSE, the IMechE and the PWI.
Abstract:
The low adhesion at the wheel-rail interface is a fundamental characteristic of railway systems, leading inevitably to long stopping distances. As a consequence, traditional fixed block methods of train control prevent railways from using the infrastructure fully. Increases in demand for railway journeys and the difficulty of adding infrastructure has led to a philosophy that enables trains to be separated by less than a full braking distance, similar to motorway driving. This concept is based on the premiss that it is unrealistic to assume that a train stops instantly and, therefore using the full braking distance in a system design is an overly cautious approach. It offers potentially greater capacity but there are concerns that a catastrophic event would occur when the preceding train is stopped instantaneously. Technologies exist for these systems. However, it has not yet been applied to operational railway systems. According to IEC 61508, a safety analysis should be performed early in the system life cycle to reduce systematic risks and reduce cost. In the paper, the authors aim to review critically the research into closer running of trains and conduct a safety analysis of the approach. To investigate the increase in railway capacity, the authors simulated a scenario of two consecutive services diverge from a line and making station stops of 90 s. The model indicated a capacity improvement of 14% over ETCS Level 3. For the safety analysis of the system, the authors compared two approaches:
(1) event chain accident causation model based safety analysis methods which include traditional tools, such as HAZOP, FMEA and FTA and
(2) a systematic theory accident causation model, which is relatively new.
They summarise the advantages and disadvantages of applying this novel approach.
For approach (1), Event Tree Analysis and Boolean algebra were applied to quantify the probability of an accident using data from industry statistics and reports covering a 10-year period. The event tree analysis indicates that the probability of a passenger being injured due to a train stopping at an unacceptable rate is 1 in 1.23 million journeys. This falls into the regions of negligible and tolerable risk. Investigations into historical incidents reveal the following as having the potential of decelerating a train rapidly: fallen trees, road vehicles, cattle, engineering work and track plant, most importantly, avalanches, landslides and debris. Thus environmental factors present the greatest hazard. Climate change increases rainfall severity increases the risk of landslides.
For approach (2), he authors extended the Unified Modelling Language into a sequence diagram meta-model for STPA, to analyse the safety of the ETCS level 4 system.
The authors identified hazards in operational scenarios, built the associated model, and discovered unsafe control actions (UCA) that could lead to hazards. For each unsafe control action, the authors further identified the causal scenarios that lead to the unsafe control action and propose mitigations or solutions. The systematic theory accident causation model based methods are applied to only one hazard analysis. Further research is therefore required to adopt the method for safety analyses.
Jan Hoogenraad, Spoorgloren
Arrival time robustness of eco driving strategies under two ATP systems
Jan Hoogenraad, AMIRSE, is the company director and owner of the Dutch consultancy firm for mobility and transport, Spoorgloren BV. Jan has a Ph.D. in Physics, he has an extensive knowledge of, and experience within the railroad sector. He has supported, and advised management amongst other things on energy usage, transport losses, train occupancy, eco-stabling, and on the pedestrian transfer function of stations.
Jan worked as a program manager, change manager and as a test and quality manager. For NS, Jan has organized and monitored eco-driving and eco-stabling programs. For the ERTMS pilot Amsterdam-Utrecht, Jan has helped to create and manage the research program. Jan has participated in the development of ATO over ETCS. Jan has developed the Dutch RolTijd Driver Advisory system, and laid the foundation for UIC IRS 90940: the standard for DAS data exchange.
Abstract:
Under ECO driving, the train driver will aim to arrive exactly on time. In order to ensure this the entry signal needs to clear in time. This paper investigates the robustness of the arrival time with respect to the clearing time of the entry signal, for four train driving strategies. We have chosen a specific situation, and applied two types of ATP systems: the Dutch NS'54 ATB system and ERTMS Level 2. We present detailed calculations of the sequence of actions the driver needs to take in each of these scenarios. Based on these actions, we determine the time of arrival and driver workload. We find that under the Dutch NS'54 ATB system trains arrive tens of seconds late, even if the signal is cleared within the timetable headway. If the signal clears later than the timetable headway, several driving strategies yield delays up to 60 seconds under the Dutch NS'54 ATB system. We compare the NS'54 ATB results ERTMS Level 2, using the same End-of-Authority (EoA) and speed restrictions (SRs). We use the same block lengths (rather than shorter blocks that could be used to optimize for either ATP system) in order to make a fair (apple to- apple) comparison. We show that in ECO driving under ERTMS Level 2, trains will experience little delay, even if the timetable headway is not met. We show that ERTMS Level 2 in combination with ECO driving improves robustness compared to the Dutch NS'54 ATB system against a later clearing of the entry signal. Also workload is reduced under ERTMS Level 2. This improved robustness and lower workload comes on top of the shorter running times and shorter headways that are inherently present for ERTMS Level 2 in the situation studied.
Arco Sierts, InteVice
Improved system modelling for better railway performance
Arco Sierts has worked as ‘project manager Network Management Systems’ at Alcatel Telecom (Rijswijk-NL) and ‘System Design Engineer’ at Alstom Transport Information Solutions (Utrecht-NL). He started in railways in 1995 via voluntary work for Dutch passengers’ organisation ROVER. In 2007 he reached the final of the ‘ProRail Innovation Contest’ and won the Railforum ‘Young Professionals Innovation Award’. Since 2009 Sierts is working as an independent railway consultant. He unveiled the complex underlying causes of the Dutch 2000’ SPAD-issue and successfully lobbied in Dutch parliament for a Parliamentary Investigation on railway maintenance and innovation, which led to a drastic policy change in favour of ERTMS. Currently he is working on a PhD-proposal concerning governance of technology, focussing on railways. This paper already reflects some elements of this.
Abstract:
It is commonly heard that the railway system is a complex system.Complexity makes the total system and its behaviour difficult to understand, especially for those who lack practical operational knowledge and experience. As a consequence, there is a serious risk that changes both inside and outside the system lead to unexpected and unwanted results, such as delays, higher costs, decreased performance and safety risks.According to the authors, this is one of the principal reasons why innovation speed in railways is slow, and the integrated railway system lacks adequate resilience towards the transportation market. The authors of this paper are therefore convinced that a better understandable modelling of the railway system will contribute strongly to an improved railway system performance. In 2010, Van den Top published his thesis "Modelling Risk Control Measures in Railways". In this thesis, which mainly focused on railway safety modelling, the so-called 'cascade model' was presented. This model was used to visualize the top-down system control chain, starting on strategic level, and ending in the real-time operational railway system. One of the fundamental conclusions was that the railway system lacks adequate bottom-up-feedback that could correct wrong assumptions of the higher level control structures. This conclusion was also drawn in many other publications and theses. In this paper we will present an improved version of the cascade model: the railway control chain model. This model shows in more detail the overall railway system control fundamentals, without going into technical detailsthat are hard to understand. As a practical added value, the model will be used to analyse the difficulties with the implementation of ETCS in Europe. The paper concludes with several improvement possibilities for ETCS: from strategic political level to operational policy and practical implementation.
Daniel Woodland, Ricardo
Abstract:
In normal operation, a train’s speed must not exceed either the safe limit (before, say, derailment may occur) or the comfort limit (where passengers may be bounced about or otherwise experience unacceptable discomfort). These characteristics can between them be defined as Vmax for the particular train type at any given location.
Since ATP systems are provided as safety systems, they must ensure that unsafe levels of overspeeding do not occur. At the same time, in order to support efficient operation of the railway, they must not be overly restrictive in constraining a driver’s normal (safe) driving behaviour.
If an ATP system is to prevent the train speed from reaching unsafe levels, it must:
Allow for delays in brake application once an intervention has been made;
Allow for the system’s own processing delays;
Allow for worst case acceleration of the train during these delay periods.
It must, therefore, initiate an intervention at a speed well below the actual safe limit.
In addition to the constraints imposed by safety, many operators also require ATP systems to:
Provide a warning to the driver if he/she is detected as overspeeding;
Allow the driver some reaction time following a warning before intervention occurs;
If such facilities are provided, the speed at which warnings must be initiated will be even further below the actual safe limit. However, in order to ensure efficient operation, such warnings are generally required to commence only once overspeeding has occurred (i.e. the train is travelling at a speed which exceeds the maximum ‘authorised’ or ‘permissible’ speed).
At this point, the implementation of ATP supervision starts to look like it will have a significant (detrimental) impact on operating speeds if drivers want to avoid intervention. Fortunately, however, the permissible speeds applied to the railway are not set at the maximum safe and comfortable speed for travel (Vmax). In general, whilst a line speed or Permanent Speed Restriction (PSR) will be based on an assessment of the track topography (and condition) and perceived acceptability (safety / comfort of ride) of movement at a given speed, that assessment is made qualitatively, based on (conservative) ‘Engineering Judgement’ and it will be formally defined as a nice rounded (down) number that can be easily displayed, read and understood from trackside signage and route descriptions. Thus, the PSR is in-fact significantly below the Vmax. In degraded conditions, these may be superseded by a lower Temporary Speed Restriction (TSR) or Emergency Speed Restriction (ESR) in order to protect against concerns that operation at the PSR is no longer safe, pending remedial works – but the basis of calculation for a TSR / ESR is similarly qualitative.
On the Mainline Railway maintained by Network Rail there are several differential PSRs, probably the most significant is that for Sprinter Trains (‘track friendly’ trains, allowed to operate at higher PSR compared to non-Sprinters passenger rolling stock and freight). Differential PSRs recognise that there are differences between train types.
Human Factors
Amanda Elliott, Innovace Disigns Ltd.
Operational and human factors testing to commission ERTMS in Denmark
Dr. Amanda C. Elliott is a Human Factors Engineer, who has specialised in rail since 2001. She has an interesting perspective, coming from a background as an engineering apprentice, followed by a degree in Ergonomics and a PhD in engineering design. In everything she does, Amanda is keen to introduce and resolve issues surrounding the people who make the systems and operations work. She led the ergonomic design of the HS1 Hitachi Javelin Stock; and was a fundamental part of the design for the S-Stock and VLU trains for London Underground. Amanda has a wide experience and interest in rail, depots, rolling stock and signalling. Amanda has most recently worked in Denmark, with a key role in the ERTMS Level 2 Baseline 3 implementation. As part of that, she has led the development of a “Human Components Mapping” methodology, which links operational hazards, operational rules and training modules to the live testing of operational staff prior to commissioning. Her current interest in the BowTie Methodology and is developing a means for high-hazard operational industries to incorporate Human Components in this barrier-based risk management process.
Abstract:
On October 21st 2018, the first ERTMS Level 2 BL3 railway was commissioned in Denmark. It was the culmination of years of technical design and development. There was also a huge effort to provide Human Factors (HF) understanding in order to ensure that the Operational personnel would be ready. Delivery of ERTMS typically focuses upon overcoming the technical and interoperability issues, especially with a new Level and Baseline. However, there is also much to do in order to understand how the system will be used in practice and to identify any concern associated with the organisation that will take over operations.This paper focuses on the investment in preparation of the people; in particular to understand and apply new Operational Rules for using ERTMS. Banedanmark has used a methodical approach to understand the system and deliver both technical and non-technical skills in their safety and service critical roles. This activity has included dealing with abnormal conditions and failure states, as well as normal running conditions. There is one perspective that interoperability and the associated Technical Specifications of Interoperability (TSI) will provide an integrated railway. However, introducing ERTMS to a railway that currently operational personnel. Convincing the internal and external authorities that the first line was operationally ready took more than gaining an Approval to Place Into Service for each of the Infrastructure and Onboard systems. The National Safety Authority did not need to assess the integrated digital railway; however, there were many parties including the internal programme and infrastructure teams and the Railway Undertaking that were very keen to see evidence of the whole system being safe in operations. Banedanmark and the Signalling Programme management have embraced an approach of operational integration through HF testing during Trial Running. The approach utilises a new methodology called Human Component Mapping, which shows how Operational Hazards, Operational Rules, Training and the Testing performed are related to one another. The Trial Running scenarios have led to important findings for improvement and as positive evidence of safety management. A feedback loop that includes technical project, operations, training and rules has made valuable changes and additions that have clarified how the system will work in service.This paper reflects on some of the findings and observations associated with such items as: level transitions; ETCS stop marker locations and use; axle counter section reset; “regulated” actions facilitated by technology; stopping at platforms; ERTMS Driver Machine Interface fitment; human workload and the number and use of screens in the control room; shunting and the use of a Hand Held Terminal for possessions and temporary shunting areas. The reader will gain an understanding of the contribution made using detailed and systematic operational testing, using a Human Factors focus and how early involvement is intended to set up a delta approach, to enable the more efficient roll out of ERTMS to other lines.
Karl King
Driving Efficiency & Resilience to Human Error: SafeCap Automated Verification of Signalling Data
Karl is a chartered Systems Engineer with extensive experience of safety critical Railway technology on both mass transit and mainline, including Automatic Train Control systems as well as Rolling Stock and Depot Operations. He has worked extensively on the development of ERTMS including for the Cambrian Early Deployment Scheme, Thameslink and Crossrail projects within the UK as well as numerous international experience including carrying out CSM and NoBo assessments in the Netherlands. He has also led the development and deployment of fully automated CBTC systems including the Victoria Line Upgrade for London Underground as well as working on their Jubilee, Northern lines and DLR.
Abstract:
Resilience to human error is a fundamental requirement of any signalling system: signalling interlockings were first deployed to provide resilience against signaller error. The move to relay and then computer based interlockings has progressively expanded the role of interlockings to automate, once manual, actions performed by signallers. As a result of this and the increasing functionality of today’s interlockings, resilience against designer error is essential to prevent errors in commissioned interlockings instigating unsafe signalling states. This resilience is becoming increasingly hard to achieve owing to the increasing complexity of computer based interlockings.
Computer science formal methods offers a solution. Already well established for safety critical software development in a range of industries, formal methods are mathematical techniques for automatically proving that complex systems comply with key safety requirements. Whereas earlier attempts to apply formal methods to signalling interlockings have struggled with limited scalability and high upfront costs before benefits can be realised, SafeCap offers an alternative approach. By working within existing signalling design processes and using the highly scalable ‘symbolic theorem proving’ approach to formal verification, SafeCap provides a demonstrably practical way to realise the benefits of formal verification with minimal upfront costs.
Alexandra McGrath, VicTrack Group Manager Signals & Power
The Art of Interrogation - For Better Requirements Capture
Alex McGrath is a rail systems engineer from the Level Crossing Removal Project in Melbourne, Australia. Some time back, she realised that the most difficult engineering problems are rarely actually technical – so to solve them, she took detours through diverse fields of knowledge, including human factors, the dynamics of human systems, system safety and risk perception, digitalisation and automation, and most recently complex systems theory. She has a depth of practical experience in rail and an unusual set of frameworks to solve entrenched combined technical/cultural/systemic problems. She is a Member of IRSE, active in the Australasian chapter, and a regular presenter at technical meetings and conferences.
Abstract:
Good requirements capture is well known to be critical to the success of a rail systems project. This paper takes a different approach to the typical guidance for requirements capture provided for engineers, bringing multiple tools of interrogation from disciplines outside rail, and using complex system change techniques including appreciative Enquiry and Interventive Interviewing to crack a real-world complex problem: external cable routes in Melbourne.
This paper has unconventional two-column formatting to assist the reader in aligning the theoretical frameworks or techniques of interrogation (left hand column) with the corresponding steps of the supporting practical example (right hand column). Each page covers a key conceptual step or technique in its entirety.
Design Resilience
Victor Abott, Jacobs Engineering Co
ROCC and Role: Implementation of operational control centres for resilience
Victor Abbott is Technical Director Rail Systems and Integration with Jacobs Engineering Group. He is a degree qualified electrical engineer, MBA graduate, Member of the IRSE, and Project Management Professional. He has 30 years’ experience in rail covering project and engineering management, rail systems engineering, and business development. He is currently Engineering Director for the Victorian Rail Infrastructure Program in Melbourne, Australia.Victor has been involved in the development of major rail projects in Australia, Asia, and the Middle East. He has led teams of rail discipline engineers and has specialties in Railway Operations Control Centres, CBTC, and SCADA systems.
Abstract:
Resilience is the ability to recover quickly from difficulties and situations that don’t go to plan. Railways are a complex and complicated business. Customers demand improved performance and value-for-money whilst rail operators strive for business excellence but often struggle for fiscal prudency.Running a railway to plan without incident or interruption, achieving customer satisfaction and business success are the major goals for rail operators. An effective Rail Operations Control Centre (ROCC) is the ‘heart and mind’ of rail operations that can meet those goals. This paper examines the role of the ROCC to achieve resiliency of the railway. Resiliency is considered two-fold:- Firstly, the ability of ROCC to contribute to the overarching resiliency of rail operations based on a set of implementation criteria. Secondly, the ROCC itself being resilient to perform its function under changing circumstances.Railway operations is the task to provide a safe, efficient, available, punctual, and effective transportation service to customers. Railway operations involves planning & scheduling (long and short term); day of operations delivery (including live run to schedule and perturbation management); incident and emergency response; and supporting functions (such as administrative, financial, procurement, human resource and asset management).The ROCC is a facility of people, processes and technology to deliver the operations plan. It is usually the pivotal point and primary command and control hub to manage operations in a modern railway. The ROCC provides supervisory, monitoring, dispatching, control, and operational safety management. It is usually concentrated in a few locations, often in a dedicated building and usually contains a main control room for day-of-operations control purposes. It is often a showpiece for the railway operator.To achieve a resilient railway operation, an effective ROCC where the people, processes and technology are brought together in a combined, cohesive, and coordinated manner can improve delivery and optimise the operations plan. The steps to implement a successful ROCC include stating the key benefits of the ROCC; establishing the key functions of the ROCC with respect the railway operation tasks; determining the ROCC key implementation criteria (i.e. time horizon, hierarchy of control, geographical and asset coverage, systems functional span, degree of centralization, and degree of integration with other systems); and determining staff roles and responsibilities and resultant operating modes. Whilst the ROCC can support a resilient railway operation, the ROCC itself must be resilient to provide its function, to be available to provide an accepted level of operational normalcy and to cope with threats and vulnerabilities. In this regard, the design of the ROCC is as important as the operational service it provides. Considering resilient control systems requirements, the design of a ROCC should consider the reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety of the rail systems deployed in the ROCC; the control room layout and arrangements including human factors; threat and vulnerability assessment including identifying the need for redundancy and back-up facilities; security; access; EMC; noise and vibration and future expansion requirements.Considering the above resiliency criteria can allow rail operations to ROCC and role.
Alexandra McGrath, VicTrack Group Manager Signals & Power
Rail’s particular challenge with resilience
Alex McGrath is a rail systems engineer from the Level Crossing Removal Project in Melbourne, Australia. Some time back, she realised that the most difficult engineering problems are rarely actually technical – so to solve them, she took detours through diverse fields of knowledge, including human factors, the dynamics of human systems, system safety and risk perception, digitalisation and automation, and most recently complex systems theory. She has a depth of practical experience in rail and an unusual set of frameworks to solve entrenched combined technical/cultural/systemic problems. She is a Member of IRSE, active in the Australasian chapter, and a regular presenter at technical meetings and conferences.
Abstract:
This paper gives an outline of resilience engineering theory & research, a summary of resilience legislation in Australia as an example of the changing worldwide approach to risk, an exploration of some of the specific challenges of rail, and case studies drawn from how we have tackled these challenges in Victoria. The field of resilience engineering asks, what is the difference between a system that is vulnerable to a system-wide cascading catastrophe, and one that has capacity to buffer or absorb a trigger event, or resist, respond, and then recover? It seeks to understand the behaviour of complex human-technical systems under stress and crisis. It has built on theories of ecology, behavioural economics, psychology and human factors, and has drawn themes together alongside the Safety II (Safety Differently) movement and decades of work in quality of practice in medicine. A set of common traits or characteristics of resilient systems have emerged across disciplines and scales of activity. These include: Buffering capacity to absorb disruptions; Flexibility versus stiffness appropriate to context, Monitoring of margin to the performance/safety boundary, Tolerance at the boundary, ie. graceful degradation vs rapid collapse, and Cross scale interactions - Downward, how high level structures create or resolve pressures and contradictions, and - Upward, how local changes influence strategic goals. (from Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson (eds) ;”Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts”, Ashgate, 2006)In contrast, rail has a long history of systematically preventing all previous catastrophes by eliminating the conditions that led to each. Signalling systems have been treated as complicated rather than complex: closed, tractable and predictable. Behaviour is kept within modelled limits and comprehensively tested before ‘going live’. Predictable behaviour is the goal of our network rules, fail-safe and redundant design, and governance via safety assurance. Cross scale interactions tend to be downwards from leadership, and stringent controls apply around:
What work is done (e.g. Standards, plus deemed to comply solutions for a particular context)
How work is done (both the direct design process, and assurance/governance e.g. via ISA).
And by whom (e.g. accredited competency of people, and safety assurance of tools/automation).
This has served us well for a very long time.However, in recent decades, rail has been challenged by the speed and low cost of technological change, greater connectivity with external systems, and leaps of technology e.g. in sensors, computing, predictive algorithms, artificial intelligence etc. Rail is also no longer seen by governments or regulators as a closed system, but as part of city, intercity or wider supply chain infrastructure. It is exposed to greater external risk, and more closely monitored. In many ways it is no longer complicated: it is complex. Modelling is near-impossible, ‘emergent’ behaviours can arise from apparently simple rules. The tools and structures we use will need to become less prescriptive and more adaptive. This paper uses real world examples to demonstrate how resilience engineering may be a way forward.
Ganesh Kumar Dwivedy, South Eastern Railway, Kolkata, India
Fallback Systems and Resilience in India
I’m G. K. Dwivedy born in the year 1964, belonging to Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers and presently working as Chief Safety Officer of South Eastern Railway zone of Indian Railways. I have graduated in Electronics Engineering and trained in Railways Signalling and Management from Indian Railway Institute of Signal Engineering, Secunderabad, and National Academy of Indian Railways, Vadodara, India respectively, trained and qualified as Internal Auditor, Assessor (A1) for IRSE Licensing scheme and IRSE license holder as Design Manager(S), Principles Designer(S) and certified to be Responsible Design Engineer.
I am Associate Member of the Institution of Railway Signal Engineers, London, UK and Member of the Institution of Railway Signal and Telecommunication Engineers, India
My Key Experience of more than 30 years is in Indian Railway Signalling and Telecommunication System Engineering, Planning, Project Execution, Maintenance, Technical Investigation and Train Operations Management; and Design, Design management, Training and Internal Auditing in British Railways signalling.
Abstract:
Outages and Failures in any systems constituting large number of components and subsystems can be reduced to a reasonable level; however, cannot be eliminated. Therefore, Fall back Systems, Methods, and Procedures are the essential features to improve the availability of any dynamic system during the failures or non-functionality of one or more components and subsystems and thus proving the resilience of the system. Indian Railways being fourth largest railway network in the world carries 22.54 million passengers and 3.18 million tonnes of freight traffic per day to meet the growing transportation need of fastest growing Asian economy and its mammoth population, which is fulfilled by the operation of more than 20,000 passenger carrying and 9,200 freight trains in 24 hours of any day of the year. Track, Rolling stock, Motive Power, Overhead Electrical Traction, Power Supply, Signalling, and Telecommunication system constituting the infrastructure and 1.3 million workforces involving in operation and maintenance, enable the running of the above mentioned huge number of trains at optimum operational efficiency. However, any outage in any one of the above subsystems of infrastructure and workforce not only affects the availability of Train Operation System but affects the society and economy at large in terms of lost man-hours. In order to mitigate the impacts of outages of the subsystems and systems as a whole, fall back systems or degraded mode of operation, methods and procedures are in place in the Indian Railways system and thus provides the necessary resilience in the system. This paper brings out the glimpses of all kind of fall back systems, method and procedure in place over the Indian Railways, designed, provided and maintained in all the subsystems of infrastructure, viz. track, rolling stock, motive power, overhead line equipment, signalling and telecommunication system, operating procedures as well as additional deployment of human element to achieve the optimum level of efficiency in the train operation and reducing the impacts of outages.
Maintenance
Xigao Liu, Beijing Hollysys, China
Adaptive real-time fault diagnosis for track circuits
Xigao Liu was born in China, January 22, 1988. He received the PH.D. degree in mechatronic engineering from China University of Mining and Technology (Beijing), China, in 2017. From 2017 until now, he was a senior system designer for Beijing Hollysys Systems Engineering Co., Ltd. working on train control systems and signal systems. Now his research areas focus on the theoretical research on the track circuit products, the research on track circuit fault diagnosis system and the solution of track circuit field application problems.
Abstract:
As an important component of the Train Control System, the railway track circuit is mainly used to realise the detection of the presence of trains and continuous information transmission between the ground-equipment and the on-board equipment. Generally, the track circuit has a lot of indoor and outdoor equipment and complex application environment, of which the fault detection can be quite difficult and any track circuit failure can cause significant disruption to rail services and be a safety risk. Therefore, it is of great importance and value to realise the fault identification and diagnosis of the track circuit. Current track circuits generally use a scheduled maintenance regime. This type of maintenance scheme is costly and time consuming since inspection has to be carried out on every track circuit periodically (typically every 6 weeks). However, urgent trackside maintenance carried out in the event of such failures is also costly, particularly when it has to be carried out during traffic hours. Recently, research into novel methods for increasing the operational dependability of industrial processes has become prevalent. The ability to detect certain incipient faults and/or provide diagnosis of failed track circuit, in a more 'intelligent' way, would have significant operational and economic advantages. In this paper, an adaptive realtime fault diagnosis system for railway track circuits was developed based on multi-section joint analysis and hierarchical diagnosis method. With the help of the real-time monitoring of track circuits data changes using condition monitoring equipment and the model-based diagnosis method, the system could realise adaptive real-time fault diagnosis for the track circuit in different environment. Based on the chain circuit model and the multi-section coupling equation of track circuits, a multi-section coupling mathematical model of the track circuit was established. The fault insertion simulation of the model was carried out to obtain the voltage and current data of the specific acquisition points when different carrier frequencies, different configurations and different fault locations were obtained. Based on the big data analysis and characteristic parameter extraction of the track circuit fault data, the fault hierarchical diagnosis method was established to realise the hierarchical location of the fault section, the 5 rough faulty areas and the 11 fine fault areas of the track circuit respectively. Based on the uniform transmission line theory and the impedance matching theory, the signal transmission mathematical model of railway digital signal cable was established and the cable fault characteristic parameters were deduced, to realise the accurate fault location method of cable fault position. Finally, to verify the track circuit model and to collect fault data, a lab-based track circuit test rig was constructed. According to the fault test results on the test rig, it is shown that the track circuit fault diagnosis system proposed by the paper can achieve the positioning accuracy of the fault section and the five rough faulty areas of the track circuit up to 100 percent, and the positioning accuracy of the 11 fine faulty areas up to 98 percent, and the fault positioning accuracy of the signal cable at the transmitting end is within plus or minus 500 meters, and the diagnosis time of all the fault is within 10 seconds for different carrier frequencies and different configurations.
Joost van Kalsbeek, Strukton Rail
Video Track Inspector
Short Bio:
Maintenance & Asset management specialist
More than a decade of hands on maintenance and reliability engineering in rail
MSc Asset Integrity Management
Now responsible for Strukton Rails’s asset management portfolio
Abstract:
The main root cause of unexpected shunting of track circuits is caused by Insulated Rail Joints. As a matter of fact over ten percent of Strukton Rail’s railway infrastructure malfunctions are caused by shunting of track circuits when they are not supposed too. Mitigating these malfunctions is of high priority.
Siemens Mobility and Strukton Rail act jointly and work on solutions in the area of predictive maintenance based on video analytics to improve the current status quo on track circuits. This use case focuses on the identification, detection and prediction of defects at track circuits, to be precise; the Insulated Rail Joint. Insulated Rail Joints are bolted rail joints containing bonded insulation materials wrapped around it. Each Insulated Rail Joint contains insulation material to electrically isolate them. Insulated rail joints are essential components in track circuits that control signalling and broken rail identification systems.
Folkert Bouma, ProRail
Rail yards, a challenge through growth and changed landscape
The author has studied electrical engineering and has over 20 years of experience in the field of system and software engineering. In the past 12 years the author works for ProRail and worked on ERTMS Train to Track integration, research on the drawbacks of track circuits and implementation of axle counters and different engineering improvement projects on marshalling and stabling yards. In the current position the expert for the implementation of open systems and standardization of operation procedures on marshalling and stabling yards.
Abstract:
This paper addresses some of the challenges that are foreseen in the future when train services are increased in relation to servicing on stabling yards.Due to economic growth and increasing mobility demand, more and more people are using public transport services in the Netherlands. Dutch Railways is facing growing demands on top of the need to replace older trains by many more modern trains allowing more seating capacity. At major parts of the network the frequencies of trains will increase. And all these trains have to be serviced. Modern single deck trains offer more seats (compared to regular single deck trains) at shorter coach lengths which often comes with changed demands for service (i.e. more technical equipment on the roof of a train set). Usually stabling yards are often used for service (parking overnight and off peak hours), cleaning, small repairs, refuelling for non-electric trains, filling water and emptying the toilets and more. Trains can be combined at stabling yards to trainsets when there is a need for more seating capacity. Obviously a stabling yard is connected to main hub stations by means of a fast connection, minimizing the time needed to put the trains into service. In the past stabling yards were oft not centrally controlled by a dispatcher and train drivers had to disembark trains for local control of points and to embark the train to continue the train movement. This limited the number of trains that could be serviced on stabling yards.To overcome this disadvantage control systems are required for stabling yards. As a result of the introduction of control systems also an efficient operation is needed. Introducing an efficient standardized operation was a path that required resilience.For stabling yards a set of requirements dedicated for yards was developed. This set of requirements comes with a list of options. Depending on the chosen flavour, either the yard is locally controlled or the control of the yard is automated with manual fall back option for the points(bound to procedures) or the yard is fully automated without the need for manual fall back. In practice the full automation option offers the highest capacity. Due to new technologies the cost of systems that implements this option has been reduced. Due to automation specific service installations and operations became part of the daily common operation, where in the past local operation rules were applied. Obviously the changed service demands need to be taken into account as well. Standardization of these installations and operations have proved to be efficient.The developed set of requirement fully adopts to stakeholder wishes. In the event a fully automated system is chosen it is comprised of open systems for interlocking and control allowing the system integrator (Infrastructure Manager) to be vendor independent and reduce costs as well. The paper highlights the history, the choice of systems as well as using new technologies in a way to reduce costs.
Juha Lehtola, Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency
Finlands Maintenance Backlog
I have been working with signalling systems in Finland from 2009. I started in consulting with design and commissioning activities. Later on I was part of the first European alliance model track enhancement project with the responsibility of all signaling works. In 2014 I joined the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency (the infrastructure manager) and began working as a project manager in signaling projects also working closely with the interlocking requirements. Currently my main task is the national ERMTS/ETCS deployment plan update. I am also working with developing the tendering processes for all kinds of signaling purchases. MIRSE since 2014.
Abstract:
The signalling system renewal project 2016-2019 was historically large by Finnish scale. By this kind of investment, the infrastructure manager can assure a high level of RAMS for years to come. Simultaneously, the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency is putting a lot of effort in preventing the maintenance backlog having an impact on the usability of the Finnish railway network. At the same time, the signalling systems are seen as a key part in digitising the railways and thus are in constant need of renewal and modification. The 2016-2018 renewal programme was a great success and now planning is to continue the good work.
Innovation and Future Development (1)
Ying Lin, Beijing Hollysys
Study of vehicle communication-based train control (VBTC)
Lin Ying, earned his Ph.D. from Southwest Jiaotong University. He worked for Beijing Hollysys Co., Ltd. since 2013. He has been working on key technologies for VOBC, including speed and distance measurement, automatic speed control, automatic speed protection, etc. In recent years, he is responsible for the design of the next generation CBTC system research. In the field of next-generation CBTC systems research, he focuses on VBTC technology and Green CBTC technology. he has published several papers related to railway signal technology in journals and international conferences retrieved by CPCI, EI.
Abstract:
Vehicle-Communication-Based Train Control System (VBTC) is one of the next generation train control systems based on the vehicle to vehicle communication. Unlick the traditional centralized train control systems which are based on the bidirectional communications between the on-board controller and wayside controller, the VBTC system is a decentralized train control system where train operation is self-disciplined by the on-board controllers. Based on the operation plan scheduled by the ATS, the on-board controller of a VBTC system obtains and calculates essential information, such as the train moving direction, speed and position data, and movement authority (MA), protecting the safety movements of train. Limited by the communication capacity of the radio communication system, communication wit all the other on-board controllers in the network at the same time is unachievable. Therefore, we propose a vehicle-vehiclecommunication model which divides all the trains into Direct Relation Trains (DRT), Indirect Relation Trains (IRT) and None Relation Trains (NRT), according to their relative positions on the network. Each train on the network can distinguish its DRTs, IRTs, and NRTs by the proposed model so that it can communicate directly with its DRTs, communicate with its IRTs via its DRTs, and not communicate with its NRTs. As a result, a train can at least acquire information of two trains in one direction on the network without overloading the radio communication system. The vehicle-to-vehicle communication model is verified on our engineering prototype of a VBTC system. The verification results indicate that the model can resolve the challenging of the vehicle-to-vehicle communication in the VBTC system.
Richard Shenton, RDS International
Valise – video balise for dependable train positioning
Richard is the founder and managing director of RDS International and has pioneered the development of the Video Train Positioning System. He has over 30 years’ experience in advanced technology systems in communications and navigation, including the design of the national GSM-R network and sub-systems for Network Rail.
Prior to Network Rail, he was a Director at Detica (now BAE Systems Applied Intelligence). As head of Rail Business at Detica he was the technical lead for the international specification of GSM-R.
Richard has an MBA (London School of Economics/HSE Paris/New York University) and MA Mathematics (Oxford). He is an IRSE Member.
Abstract:
Valise is a virtual balise system which builds on recent advances in vision-based positioning for autonomous cars and adapts them for the rail environment. It offers an alternative to track-mounted transponders and balises. Integrated with GNSS and inertial sensors, the technology provides continuous dependable trackprecisetrain positioning. It offers reliable positioning information for degraded mode working in the event of failure of the primary signalling system. In addition, providing advice of the position with route information to the driver could enhance safety and confidence when operating in these conditions. As a result, the system improves operational resilience in response to signalling failures and other out of course operations. The content of the paper is described below. Valise technology In parallel to wider industry activities to develop virtual balises using GNSS, RDS has focussed on developing a complementary technology based on real-time image processing of forward-facing CCTV images. The RDS Video Train Positioning System (VTPS) uses a dead reckoning approach measured from a known location. For this absolute or spot location, the forward facing camera initially read bar code signs (‘visual balises’) at the side of the track. Feedback from infrastructure managers indicated a reluctance to deploy additional signs at the trackside. Now a new approach has been developed to locate a train at a point on a specific track using video - a video balise. Broadly, the live images from the camera are matched with a database of images taken at known locations on previous journeys. When a match is found, the location of the train is known. In order to optimise the matching process, the system compares small ‘fingerprints’ that are derived from the much bigger images. The design of the fingerprint enables the technique to be resilient to changes in environmental conditions, such as day, night rain and snow. The paper will describe the system in more detail, including overall operations and maintenance of fingerprints and track databases. Performance and safety A project is now underway in the UK to evaluate the technology. The project partners are Network Rail (infrastructure manager), First Group (train operator), Omnicom Balfour Beatty (survey and monitoring) and Nottingham Scientific (GNSS specialist) together with RDS. Nottingham Scientific with its experience in virtual balise research and development is working with RDS and its video based approach to provide a combined system which has the dependability needed for safety related applications. The performance results and safety approach will be presented in the paper. Initial applications The paper will present the initial applications that are being demonstrated: - Track precise positioning for infrastructure monitoring from service trains (fitted to Network Rail New Measurement Train and compared with Omnicom’s existing ‘state of the art’ Real Time Positioning System) - Positioning for selective door operation (on service trains operating on route from Manchester Airport to Leeds) - Virtual temporary and emergency speed restrictions, eliminating the need for trackside boards (vehicles and routes same as previous).
Fei Yan, Beijing Jiaotong University
Abstract:
Dr. Fei Yan received the Ph.D. degree in 2007 from Beijing Jiaotong University . He is currently an Associate Professor of the School of Electronic and Information Engineering in Beijing Jiaotong University and He was a Visiting Scholar in the Civil Engineering and Environment Department, Imperial College London from Aug 2017 to July 2018. He led R&D team of the LCF-300 CBTC systems to get the SIL4 safety certificate from Lloyd’s Register Rail. In 2010, Beijing Yizhuang Line is successfully opened as Chinese first self-innovation CBTC system. His research area focuses on Railway Operation Safety and System Safety Assurance. From 2015, he participated in the study on Intelligent Maintenance and Reliability Improvement research projects for Beijing Metro. Contact him at fyan@bjtu.edu.cn.
Development Trend and Direction of Train Control System
Lead Author: Bin Ning
Co-authors: Chunhai Gao, Tao Tang, Hairong Dong, Jing Xun, Yidong Li, Feng Bao
On June 14th, 2019 we received the sad new that prof Bin Ning was fatally injured in serious traffic accident and passed away.
He was on his way to the World Transportation Convention in Beijing. BJTU (Beijing Jiaotong University) has officially confirmed this news and announced the obituary notice.
Professor Fei Yan will present professor Ning's paper.
Abstract: Based on the comprehensive analysis of train control systems for mainline railways and urban rail transits, and combined with the current status and development trends of rail transit equipment and technology, this paper puts forward the development trend and direction of equipment and technology for train control sysyem in the future. With the safe and efficient moving block system, it will form the intelligent control, operation and maintenance system based on ubiquitous perception, train-to-train communication and big data technologies. The integration of train control and traffic management will enhance the ability of recovery when disturbance occurs. Train control systems of high-speed railway and normal-speed railway are serialized. Train control systems of high-speed railway and urban rail transit are integrated, which eventually makes different train control systems compatible.
Grahame Taylor, Tern Systems Ltd.
Key Token Signalling for the 21st Century
Grahame Taylor is a chartered civil engineer who joined British Rail in 1965 as a trainee draughtsman. By privatisation he was in charge of all structural and track maintenance for the Regional Railways’ business in the north west of England. In 1996 he became an independent consultant setting up his own company that specialised in capturing railway permanent way engineering knowledge using the then new digital media. From 2009 until 2017 he was editor of the Rail Engineer magazine, at the same time as developing the Ternkey system based on his extensive railway engineering expertise.
Abstract:
This paper outlines the development of the Networked Digital Key Token System, or NDKTS, that couples 21st century electronics with the principles of traditional, physical key token working.
Simple single line railways, for which sophisticated signalling is not an option, may have passing loops but may not have the personnel nor signalling infrastructure to operate them. Even if conventional token machines are available, then these can require cabling between machines and, most importantly, offer no operating flexibility. Thus train running is tied to fixed timetables and cannot react to passenger expectations, or perturbations of rolling stock performance.
NDKTS, having been developed from scratch, has given the opportunity to use as many Components Of The Shelf (COTS) as possible. Bespoke locks are assembled from stock items with just a few specialist components, all of which can be made using conventional machining.
It has been designed for railways with a mixed, transient rolling stock for which permanent in-cab signalling is inappropriate. This paper will outline the background to the project, the key design considerations that have affected it and the process of evolution from prototype to a marketable product.
Architecture
André Radomiak, Alstom System Design Authority
A fair signalling architecture
André is an experienced Railway Systems engineer, classified in Alstom’s organization as Senior Expert in signalling systems development and application, with over 25 years’ experience in railway systems, signalling ERTMS specifications, development and projects. André started his carrier on TFM SSI product development, he specialized his signalling knowledge in design, development and implementation of innovative signalling systems, ATP, and ATO for high capacity lines (e.g. Hong Kong East Rail lines). Prior to his current positions in Alstom Digital Mobility, he acquired experience from various positions in Project execution in signalling systems design, specification, architectures, system development technics, “design for safety”, process leadership, risk management and technical problem solving.
Abstract:
For decades, electronic interlockings have been mostly based on an architecture having the interlocking logic processed by safe computers either centrally located (main signalling building) or distributed (e.g. in stations). The central or distributed choice being driven by a series of decision factors often linked to operability, availability, and maintainability. The electronic interlocking is then connected to Object Controllers (OC) strategically grouped or distributed along the railway network, "dumbly" interfacing the interlocking logic to the signalling objects. Grouping or distributing OC is again the result of decision factors similar to those mentioned for the interlocking previously; the trend is however to minimize cables by placing OC close to signalling objects for the purpose of copper volume reduction, while minimizing associated construction, installation and testing works. While this standard architecture provides flexibilities to answer most Infrastructure Manager's needs, the centralized logic increases the system reaction times, creates complexities in the central logic (e.g. logic for aspect and point proving functions, aspect graceful degradation, points normalisation,..), and has impacts on later signalling engineering activities, requiring full possession of the central interlocking's logic during upgrade, test and commissioning. For the ETCS level 2, RBCs are associated to interlockings, but RBC borders are often at locations different from the interlocking ones. It is due to the RBC/RBC borders constraints leading their implementation nearly impossible in dense area but mostly only in plain track. Moreover, to mitigate potential traffic operation disturbances from driver operational issues (wrong RBC Id) or ETCS radio failures (in operation braking), the amount of RBC/RBC borders is kept minimized. To reduce the number of RBC/RBC borders, ERTMS manufacturers are designing higher capacity RBCs, managing more trains and covering largest railway areas. In result of this, signalling engineering activities phasing and possessions are becoming more complex and difficult to handle. The ETCS architecture becomes monolithic, with less flexibility to support interlocking architectures variability. From these observations, it is necessary to rethink the interlocking architectures we know, and to look at reducing interfaces by integrating interlocking and ETCS, enhance reaction times and robustness, and cancel the constraints born with the RBC/RBC borders. This presentation will look into scalable architecture solutions, simple to deploy, with scalable resilience to failures and operational disturbances. It will be explained how a new interlocking architecture, based on a fair leadership principle, simplifies or even suppresses the central interlocking logic by reallocating it into intelligent object controllers, able to locally manage functional sets of signalling objects or specific processes (e.g. level crossings). Interlocking and RBC functions could then be integrated in clusters, easier to put in service and maintain. Combining the clusters allows then to cover a country wide domain under a single RBC entity (i.e. without RBC/RBC radio hand-over), operating 1000 trains. By increasing operational availability, operability, and maintainability, the ETCS based signalling system becomes more resilient and sustainable while avoiding the need to continuously increase safe computer performances.
Natsuki Terada, Railway Technical Research Institute
Scalable and relocatable interlocking device
Graduated from graduate school of University of Tokyo in 1996, and entered Railway Technical Research Institute in 1996.
Since then engaged in research, development and assessment of signalling systems, especially on track circuits. Currently laboratory head of signalling systems laboratory of RTRI.
From 2008 to 2013 engaged in development and evaluation of DS-ATC systems for Hokuriku-shinkasen extension, especially for change-over section between 50Hz and 60Hz power supply. And from 2008 to 2010 engaged in development of track circuits for long distance.
Also engaged in research of formal verification of signalling and acquired doctor's degrees on engineering in 2015.
Abstract:
Most of interlocking devices are installed at stations. When a trouble happens, maintenance staffs must go to the station to repair the device where the interlocking device is installed. Especially when interlocking devices are severely damaged by lightning and/or disasters, it takes a lot of times to resume the interlocking functions. In addition, when an interlocking device is being replaced to a new device, a lot of works are required. For example, the cables are usually connected directly with physical devices such as track circuits, signal lights, point machines, etc. These physical devices must change their connections into new interlocking devices. After the connections are changed, many verification processes are required. These maintenance and replacing works will be especially difficult for the small railway provide “Interlocking as a Service.”To reduce the cost to replace and resume the interlocking functions, interlocking devices should be separated from physical devices. Then, interlocking functions will be realized under cloud computing environment. When main interlocking functions are separated from physical devices, it is expected to reduce the cost of maintaining and/or replacing the interlocking devices. In addition, this technology may open a business of “Interlocking as a Service.”We draw an image of interlocking systems implemented on cloud computing environment as follows. Interlocking functions are implemented at the interlocking center, manufacturer for small railway operator, or by railway operators themselves. The interlocking center can be placed relatively safe from disasters. When network is affordable, the interlocking center can be distributed. Physical devices such as track circuits and point machines will be connected to the interlocking center via networks. The terminals with physical devices will be installed at stations. The terminals require fail-safe functions in case there is no command from interlocking center. We consider two kinds of terminals; the one is installed at signal houses as seen by traditional signaling equipment, has the network interface and connected to physical devices by cables. The other is implemented within the physical devices. In this case network function is also implemented within the physical devices. Radio connection is also possible. In this case control commands will be directly issued to the physical devices. When there is a trouble for some part of physical devices or cables, temporal service is possible using radio based connections.When the interlocking functions are implemented on cloud computing environment, the cost of maintaining interlocking devices will be reduced, because most of the maintenance work will be executed at interlocking center. It is also expected to make the interlocking devices resilient to the disaster, by moving the function to the safe place against the disaster and/or preparing redundant interlocking center. In addition, the cost of replacing interlocking devices will be reduced in large amount, because the replacement of interlocking devices will be possible just by switching one virtual machine of interlocking functions to another.
Luke Church, Thales
Architecting railway systems for resilience
Luke is the Lead Systems Engineer for the Jubilee and Northern Lines Systems Upgrade, focussing on enhancing and extending Thales' CBTC system which is deployed on these lines. Having previously worked in research and technology he is passionate about innovation, particularly driving the implementation of new technology on railways. He has maintained active involvement with innovation at Thales and is currently managing a programme of research developing novel train control systems.
Abstract:
The primary purpose of a railway is to safely and reliably transport people and goods; resilience to disruption is crucial to railways achieving this purpose. A railway is a highly complex system, consisting of multiple interconnected sub-systems; enhanced resilience can be achieved by analysing the architectures of railways systems, for example signalling systems, which are the subject of analysis in this paper.Resilience is defined as the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties. In the context of a railway this includes maintaining a normal service during minor disruptions and ensuring graceful degradation and swift recovery from major disruptions.There are four basic principles of resilience: capacity, flexibility, tolerance and cohesion. Railway systems are highly effective at achieving resilience through capacity, or more specifically redundancy. Examples include physical redundancy through duplicating components to avoid single points of failure, as well as functional redundancy such as secondary train detection in metro systems. Historically railway systems have had less focus on achieving resilience through flexibility, tolerance and cohesion. This paper explores how systems outside of the railway achieve resilience through these other principles, and propose means of applying these principles to railway systems to improve resilience.Insights can be gained into existing railway systems by reverse architecting the system to understand its context and interactions between component parts. Conversely, forward architecting can be used to develop system architectures of new railway systems to ensure they best meet the needs of the user. This paper will present case studies of both approaches; reverse architecting an existing railway system to understand how it achieves resilience and insights into how resilience may be improved, as well as how a new railway system is architected for resilience by design.Threats to the railway from sources such as cyber-attacks and extreme weather are increasing. At the same time more train services are being introduced through modernisation of infrastructure, which reduces the margin to withstand disruption through absorption, and limits are being reached in what can economically be achieved through redundancy. Railway performance can be improved by architecting new and existing railway systems for resilience, taking into consideration the lesser utilised principles of flexibility, tolerance and cohesion within railway systems.
Malcolm D'Cruz, Rio Tinto
Backbone for the Digital Railway
Malcolm D'Cruz is a Signalling and Systems Consultant with more than 10 years' experience across multiple railway signalling projects. Working as a Project Engineer/Project Manager, Malcolm has delivered integrated solutions in the field of rail systems in both freight and passenger rail. Malcolm has recently developed a keen interest in condition monitoring and data analytics to identify opportunities and improvements through a process of defect elimination prioritisation.
Abstract:
Railways are always increasing the number of network services to cope with emerging technologies. The success of Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) depends on the ability of the backbone communication system to guarantee high bandwidths and reliability. Thus the traditional role of railways as a network operator is gradually moving towards a service provider for both internal as well as external clients.
The quick fix solution that railways currently adopt is to deploy parallel networks over the communication backbone system to cope with the demand of emerging technologies like Video Analytics in Closed Circuit Television Cameras (CCTV), Long Term Evolution 4G digital radio and CBTC. This basically means adding a new box each time a new network service is required and the funding comes on top of the operational costs for maintaining the railway in the form of capital expenditure for an Information and Communications Technology (ICT) refresh.
The drawback with hardware-based solutions is that they rapidly reach end of life and require a reiteration of the design-integrate-deploy cycle with little or no revenue benefit and require operational outages for deployment of changes or upgrades. Passenger railway operators are not profit driven, the "no-revenue benefit" factor doesn't really appeal to them instead passenger railways are more worried about public relations and the impact caused by prolonged or unexpected outages. Therefore minimizing impacts to the operating systems and the railway overall is more appealing to passenger rail operators.
The challenge for backbone railway communication networking is to have a common platform for all network services whilst being ready for emerging technologies like CBTC.
Telecom service providers are faced with the same set of problems every time there is a new network service to be launched, the most common problems are high equipment costs of parallel networks, increased power consumption by addition of new hardware, space issues for retrofitting new hardware, longer deployment times means reduced lifecycle benefits of the hardware, since the technology becomes obsolete by the time the hardware is deployed.
To address these issues, Telecom service providers have embraced the virtualisation trend in information technology to perform network functions which are traditionally provided by hardware such as routers and switches.
The aim of this paper is to show how Software Defined Networks (SDN) adopted by telecom service providers as a common platform for all network services can benefit the railway networking environment to cope with constantly emerging technologies.
Innovation and Future Development (2)
Matthew Slade, CPC Systems Ltd.
Virtualising control centres: can cloud computing deliver increased resilience?
Matt celebrates his 10th year in the rail industry this September. Having graduated from the University of Sheffield he enrolled on Thales’ Rail Signalling graduate scheme in in 2009. The rest is history….Matt is passionate about delivering change in the rail industry, utilising modern technology and data from modern control systems to drive improvements. He is a previous IRSE Younger Members chair and is grateful to the IRSE for broadening his knowledge beyond his day to day project life.Matt is now Associate Director for CPC Systems Ltd, an SME consultancy specialising in railway performance and reliability growth.
Abstract:
The use of 'cloud' computing has become increasingly prevalent over the last 10 years; 95% of organisations now use some form of 'cloud' based computing. Virtualisation is one service commonly grouped under the term 'cloud' and refers to the logical splitting of hardware resources to abstractly run multiple 'Virtual Machines'. This process is commonly used to provide desktops for employees and to host servers for data storage or running of applications. Migrating to virtual environments provides a range of benefits, including scalability, hardware cost savings and maintenance efficiency.More recently Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have started harnessing the benefits of virtualisation by hosting their supervisory, planning and management layer applications in virtual environments. It is estimated that 30% of current ICS systems contain some form of virtualisation and this is expected to increase significantly over the coming years. Within the railway industry we are yet to commonly adopt virtualisation, this is partly due to our focus on integrity and availability in comparison to most industrial control systems and everyday business.This paper introduces virtualisation and proposes an architecture for Railway Signalling Control Systems utilising virtual machines to host the train control and traffic management layers of our systems. The objective of this paper is to stimulate discussion regarding the adoption of such a change, highlighting the benefits to the resilience of our railways and the challenges such a change would introduce. The topics to be discussed include:
System Availability – Use of virtualisation facilities such as resource pooling, encapsulation, live transfer of guest environments and geographic diversity, enhancing the fault tolerance and availability.
Maintainability – Centralisation of software and hardware to remote locations allowing easier access for engineers.
Obsolescence Management – Migration of some functions into software that would otherwise be provided by Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment (e.g. network switches and physical servers). This will reduce the overhead for recertification hardware as COTS suppliers update firmware and components.
Backup Control Facilities - The ability to provide low cost back up control facilities using virtualised servers and workstations.
Testing and Commissioning – Creation of virtual test systems to verify correct operation of software patches and updates prior to commissioning on live systems. The tested updates can be installed and configured prior to being seamlessly transferred into service.
Work Force Competence - Consideration of the changes the industry will need to make in order to upskill the workforce to support the change. - Commercial Arrangements – The challenge of developing an appropriate commercial and practical framework for the supply of virtual environments by internal or third party suppliers.
Cybersecurity – Inevitably virtualisation increases the potential attack surface of our systems. However, this change also provides advantages over the status quo. The paper summarises the pros and cons and looks at the next steps required to address the challenges related to cybersecurity.Virtualisation is benefiting other industry sectors; the Signalling and Telecommunications community must strive to address the challenges of its introduction in our environment, in order to realise the benefits for our clients.
Egidio Quaglietta, Delft University of Technology
Exploring virtual coupling: operational principles and capacity analysis
Egidio Quaglietta is assistant-professor in Railway Traffic Management at Delft University of Technology. He has a PhD in transport engineering from the University of Naples Federico II and has been actively working in the railway field since 2008, when he joined the Italian railway supplier Ansaldo STS. As a postdoc at TU Delft, he has been involved in developing and testing advanced algorithms for railway traffic planning and management. Egidio has then worked for the British railway infrastructure manager Network Rail, where he led workstreams on railway innovation for the UK programme Digital Railway and the EU funded project Capacity4Rail.
Abstract:
The ever-increasing railway transport demand of passengers and goods has been significantly challenging infrastructure managers in increasing the capacity of existing networks which are already close to saturation. Infrastructure upgrades are costly and not always feasible, especially in densely built-up areas. The railway industry is therefore opting to deploy next-generation signalling concepts which can better utilise existing infrastructure by overcoming traditional fixed-block separation so to let trains move closer to each other. Signalling technologies like ETCS Level 3 are being developed to allow separating trains by an absolute-braking distance (i.e. the distance needed to reach a standstill from current speed) by replacing vital track-side equipment with onboard devices for integrity monitoring and dynamic braking supervision. Capacity benefits provided by such a system are however limited for high-speed lines, where distances between trains can reach up to 4-5 km when operating at speeds around 300 km/h. The concept of Virtual Coupling is hence gaining in popularity since it builds on the principle of separating trains by a relative-braking distance, i.e. the distance needed to slow down to the speed of the train ahead. Trains are envisaged to directly communicate to each other via a Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication to keep a safety distance and move synchronously in platoons (here called convoys) which can be treated as a single train at junctions to gain capacity. Similar setups have been tested in the road sector for automated cars under cooperative adaptive cruise control, however non-negligible safety issues arise for railways that could compromise capacity benefits of Virtual Coupling in interlocking areas. Safety risks are especially at diverging junctions where points might not have enough time to safely be moved and locked in between consecutive trains. Principles to safely regulate convoy merging/diverging operations under Virtual Coupling have not been defined yet and only little research has been done to identify impact of safety constraints on capacity benefits of Virtual Coupling. This paper contributes to a wider understanding of this signalling concept by introducing preliminary operational principles for safe train operations under Virtual Coupling and analysing potential impacts on capacity. An infrastructure occupation capacity model for Virtual Coupling has been developed by extending the blocking time theory with defined operational principles. The model has been implemented in the microscopic railway traffic simulation tool EGTRAIN for a detailed capacity computation by means of the UIC Code 406 method. Capacity gains provided by Virtual Coupling have been compared to ETCS Level 3 for different service scenarios. Results obtained for a railway corridor on the South West Main Line in the UK provide useful insights for the railway industry to support early investment decisions on V2V-based railway technologies.
Stephan Lemon, Transport for New South Wales
Digital Systems: Transforming Rail Transport in Sydney with ETCSL2, TMS & ATO
Stephen Lemon is the Program Director of Digital Systems, a major Transport for NSW program that will transform Sydney’s existing rail network to help meet the city’s future transport needs. Digital Systems will replace legacy signalling and train control technologies with modern, internationally proven, intelligent systems based around European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2 technology. Stephen has more than 30 years’ experience in the Australian and UK rail industries and previously held roles in Transport for NSW as the Director of Rail Systems Development and as Sydney Trains’ Professional Head of Signalling and Control Systems.
Stephen’s experience spans project management, engineering and consultancy in both the public and private sectors across a variety of infrastructure environments, including freight, heavy rail, metro and light rail. Stephen is a Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng) and Fellow of the Institution of Railway Signal Engineers (FIRSE).
Abstract:
Transport for NSW’s Digital Systems Program is transforming the way the Sydney rail network is managed and operated. It will provide a ‘step-change’ introduction of a new traffic management system, radio-based cab signalling and automatic train operation to assist drivers, who will still remain in control. The first deployments will be at the two ends of one of Sydney’s busiest suburban lines, allowing for the parallel development of two ETCS suppliers with interoperable solutions. Subsequent deployments of Digital Systems will be prioritised to increase capacity on the most constrained lines of the network first. An overarching program of rail upgrade projects, ‘More Trains, More Services’, has been formed to manage that prioritisation and bundle the Digital Systems rollout on any corridor with additional improvements and enabling activities required for higher service capacities, including traction power system upgrades.
A key challenge for introducing ETCS to a high-density brownfield operation near its capacity limits is the minimisation of service disruption combined with the transformative nature of Digital Systems. Learning from international best practice and the experiences of comparable projects, combined with effective knowledge transfer is vital for successful ETCS introduction far from Europe. Our paper will present and update the evolution of the transformative ‘Digital Systems’ program for the people of Sydney.
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