Aspect 2019 - Introductory Day
- 24 okt 2019
- 26 minuten om te lezen
Level Crossings
No barriers for level crossings with ERTMS
Maarten Bartholomeus, ProRail
Maarten Bartholomeus is working as ERTMS expert within the Dutch Inframanager ProRail since 2007. He has twenty years of experience in ERTMS and has worked in several railway projects as engineer, consultant, project manager and assessor. Maarten has a master degree in Physics. As ERTMS expert Maarten is responsible for the Dutch ERTMS engineering rules, ERTMS project specifications and ERTMS user processes. Maarten actively cooperates with the ERTMS User Group and the European Railway Agency in establishing specifications and guidelines for ERTMS. Maarten is one of the founders of the Hybrid Level 3 concept and co-author of the Hybrid Level 3 principles.
Abstract:
The best level crossing is no level crossing. But although the goal is to eliminate the level crossings this may not always feasible or affordable. Does the introduction of ERTMS allow to innovate the level crossing protection? Can the ERTMS system provide ways to protect level crossings providing an more constant warning time and if possible reduce the announcement time of the level crossing due to variations in the train speed and/or deviations in the planned operation?In the conventional signalling system trackside train detection is used to close the level crossing if the train in the depicted announcement zone. As the train in ERTMS reports it position and speed, can this information be used to provide a safe mechanism to close the level crossing? Even with issues as communication delays, lost messages, position inaccuracies, etc? Furthermore could this result in a more constant and even shorter level crossing closing time.As discussed in earlier presentations [ETCS and Level crossings, RG 2017] the type of level crossing protection concepts vary. For The Netherlands the announcement time can be relative short because the closure of the level crossing is considered to be failsafe. This deviates from some countries where the barriers have to be reported as closed before the train is authorised across the level crossing. This introduces a risk that with train detection failures, e.g. a loss of shunt, that the barriers are not closed in time. This issue is more imminent with the modern trains and often requires additional trackside train detection. Can ERTMS information help to reduce the required train detection and reduce this risk?As the fail-safe operation of the level crossing can result in long closing times in degraded situations, special procedures are applicable when a level crossing is closed to long or reported as malfunctioning. Can ERTMS provide information to improve these procedures?Level crossings close to a platform for short stops often suffer from long closing times due to the unpredictable delays in dwelling. If possible special short announcements zone are created in these area's to minimise impact of the variations in the dwelling times. However this requires additional trackside train detection and localized logic which is expensive. How can ERTMS provide information and protection for these type of level crossings?In this presentation the improvements with ERTMS for the mentioned issues for level crossing protection are presented and discussed. These improvements are included in the ERTMS specification for the Dutch ERTMS roll-out program.
Clarifying design guidelines of level crossing logic with functional resonance analysis method
Akimasa Okada, East Japan Railway Company
Akimasa Okada received the B.E. degree in mathematical engineering and information physics and M.S. degree in information physics and computing from the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Since 2006, he has been an engineer with East Japan Railway Company in a field of signallingsystems. He received Ph.D. degree at the University of Tokyo in 2016. His current research interests include safety analysis method, a sensing system, and two-dimensional communication. Dr. Okada is a member of IRSE, IEICE, IEEE, and SICE.
Abstract:
Introduction
Railway transportation becomes more important due to properties such as safety, energy-saving, and mass transit. Safety is the most important for the railway and availability is also required for stable operation. Recently, in addition to those properties, resilience, with which operation can be provided at least partly even under disorder, is drawing attention. In the field of signalling systems, resilience is considered to correspond to keeping safety under irregular situations. In East Japan Railway Company (JRE), logic of level crossings (LCs) which is configured with electric relays has achieved resilience because a vast number of LCs, more than six thousand, ensure safety in various situations including train disorder. While the relay-based logic achieves high safety, it should be replaced with software-based logic to improve maintainability and workability. The factors leading to the resilience of the current logic are useful for the software-based logic. However a large part of them are implicit. Therefore clarifying those factors is required. In this paper, we examined a safety analysis method called functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) to clarify those factors.
Method
FRAM is proposed in a field of resilience engineering as a method to express interactions among functions of a system. In FRAM each function has six aspects: input, output, precondition, time, control, and resource and the functions are connected through those aspects. Analysts discover characteristics of the system from the FRAM model. We applied FRAM to the reference LC logic patterns used in JRE and clarified implicit design guidelines.
Result
We obtained the eleven design guidelines from the FRAM analysis. The most significant one is a hierarchical logic structure found in all the reference logics. In the hierarchical structure, the functions configure the three layers: a physical-sensor layer like train detectors, a train-tracking function layer, and a warning layer. Each function interacts only with functions in the neighbouring layer. This simple structure is considered to enable safety logic of LCs where detail logic is strongly dependent on rail network. However, the physical sensor to stop warning is connected directly to the warning layer in addition to the traintracking function. From this direct connection, we found another success factor that the LC must start warning immediately if something wrong happens to the warning-stop sensor. We collected opinions from JRE signalling engineers about implicitness and importance of the obtained design guidelines. Almost all of them answered that the guidelines are important and natural but not documented.
Conclusion
In this paper, we clarified the design guidelines of the LC logic which are considered to achieve resilience at LCs. FRAM was applied to the reference logic patterns of JRE which show representative LC logics and include much implicit knowledge and know-hows. We extracted the eleven design guidelines, which are implicit and essential for the signalling engineer of JRE. We also ensured from this achievement that FRAM is useful to clarify implicit knowledge from an existing system. Those philosophies will be utilized for a next development of LC equipment.
Obstacle Detector for Level Crossing using Infrared Camera and Image Processing
Ryuta Nakasone, Railway Technical Research Institute
Mr. Ryuta NAKASONE received Master degree in engineering from Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology, Japan, in 2014. Since 2014 he has been a researcher at Railway Technical Research Institute, Japan. His research interests include image processing and satellite positioning and navigation system.
Abstract:
Level crossings, being the interface between railway and road traffic, compose a potential risk of accidents to railway operation. In Japan, there are around 33,000 level crossings and over 90% are equipped with automatic barriers. Despite these efforts made by the government and railway operators, every year more than 200 people are injured due to accidents inside level crossings. In order to detect pedestrians trapped inside level crossings, we propose a new Obstacle Detector (OD) using infrared camera and image processing algorithm mounted on fail-safe processing unit.ODs have been introduced in Japan since the 1960s. A conventional approach is to use laser beams that detect an obstacle by breaking the loop made by the beam. This is a simple and robust way to detect large obstacles inside the level crossing but has the limit of sensing areas, only a single line made by the laser. Nowadays new ODs using LiDAR or RADAR as a source of detection have been introduced. Although these new sensors are capable of detecting obstacles spatially, its performance to detect obstacles close to the road surface is unstable. This is a problem because, for example, detection of people who have fallen down inside the level crossing becomes difficult. In order to solve such problem and improve detection performance, we have developed new OD using infrared camera. Under the method proposed infrared camera is used as the sensor to acquire constant image of the crossing and to detect targets irrespective of their height. By applying the infrared camera, the device has features not found in the conventional devices, such as excellent resistance against weather and sunlight conditions, and does not require illumination. Obstacle detection is performed by image processing technique, using a combination of background subtraction and machine learning method. In general, background subtraction methods have a weakness of detect static objects, in this case a person stuck inside the crossing for a period of time. To overcome this problem, we apply Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) which allows us to reduce the influence of environmental noise and still to be able to detect static targets.We have developed a prototype system in which the detection algorithms is implemented in a pair of Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) boards with fail-safe architecture consists of bus synchronized dual CPUs. Performance verification tests have been conducted at several locations, and as a result, have confirmed that the device has an ability to detect people with minimum erroneous detection regardless of weather and seasonal factors. Furthermore, we will conduct field tests from December 2018, using the prototype to verify the performance under various conditions and situations.Our paper describes the devices' architecture and image processing algorithms for obstacle detection in the level crossing and introduces the results of experiments. We are sure that our proposing method contributes to improvement of conventional devices and enhance safety of the level crossing.
Resilience
Getting it right…the earlier, the better
Keith Upton, SNC-Lavalin Atkins
Keith graduated from the University of Bristol in 2011 with a first class honours masters degree in Electrical and Electronic Engineering. Keith is currently a signalling engineer working in the scheme development team in the UK. He is working towards chartership, his Signalling Principles Design license and is a Deputy CRE (under mentorship). Keith has previously worked in signalling construction as a supervisor on level crossings and other re-signalling projects giving him a good understanding of the challenges of construction site work. He is also an assistant signalling tester and used these skills during re-signalling schemes. Keith was also the assistant to the professional head of signalling for six months, which has given him an understanding of investigations, standards and technical strategic matters. He has a large breadth of experience undertaking placements across signalling (and other disciplines). Keith is continually working towards achieving chartered engineering status through the IET and is actively involved in the IRSE. Keith was the IRSE Younger Members chairperson from 2017-2019 and is currently an Associate Member on IRSE Council. Keith is also a committed STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) ambassador and regular organises and attends events to inspire the next generation of STEM students across all ages.
Abstract:
There's always criticism about projects going over budget and over time. As a project increases in cost, the onus is on getting the core of the work completed and so the "extras" often associated with improving the future resilience are cut. In other words, the next 2, 5, 10, 20, 30 years are often side lined. This could mean that the signalling systems installed now may not be as resilient as the signalling systems that are being replaced.Cost increases are often due to scope changes during the later stages of a project when detailed design starts. It is widely known that a scope change later in a project will be more expensive than a scope change early in a project. In the UK, Network Rail (the infrastructure owner) define a project in GRIP (Governance for Railway Investment Projects) stages. These consist of eight stages – the first four are all the scheme development stages where costs will be lower, stages 5 and 6 are detailed design, construction, testing and commissioning. Changes at stages 5 and 6 will mean significant changes to the overall cost of a project. These eight stages are generally well defined, and particularly within signalling, specific deliverables are required at certain stage gates. Objective and Methods: This paper will explore the GRIP stages for the UK. The author will look at whether these stages are still suitable and will look specifically at GRIP stages 1-4. Then the author will explore why the scheme development stages are so important to build in resilience at an early stage and avoid costly scope changes at a later stage. It will also look at how the stages for signalling compare with other disciplines, and the challenges that the signalling stage gates have compared with other disciplines. Conclusions: The stage gate reviews, introduced by Network Rail in 2015/2016, are good and help to further define the stages of a project but they are sometimes seen as a tick box exercise with a minimal budget and are only seen as a requirement to close out as quickly as possible so that the detailed design can get started. However, the scheme development stages are critical to the successful development of a project. These are the stages when all aspects of a scheme should be thought through, assessed and stakeholders can agree on the scope of the project. Therefore, by the end of GRIP 4 the scope can be frozen with all stakeholders agreeing that the scheme will give the required output. The scheme development stage is also a good chance to look to the future and build in resilience and future proofing. This can be designed in at the outset rather than being a "bolt on" during GRIP stages 5 or 6. The scheme development stages are also a good time to start producing outlines for any deliverables that are normally produced at GRIP 5. The current strategies are good but there perhaps needs to be a culture change that duly recognises the importance of the early GRIP stages.
Resilience – more than just Technology
Disney Schembri, Siemens Rail Automation UK
Disney Schembri is an Account Manager Assistant for Siemens Rail Automation in the UK, assisting and supporting new business development in Mass Transit.
She has an electrical engineering degree and joined Siemens as part of their Graduate Programme in 2015. During her graduate scheme she worked in various placements including R&D, Systems Engineering and Sales and Business Development.
Since coming off the graduate scheme in 2017, Disney has supported some of Siemens’ customers such as Network Rail, digital Railway and Transport for London and focused on how we can better understand and fulfill our customer’s current and future needs.
Abstract:
Maintaining the safety of the railway when systems fail is only one aspect of resilience, when considered in the context of future command, control and signalling systems. Other factors against which the resilience of future solutions will be tested are changing environments, both natural and man-made, changes in passenger habits and human resource management as well as in the industry landscape and transport market.
It is predicted that the overall trends in climate change will be towards longer and warmer summers, increased rain and flooding, and colder winter periods, all of which impact the railway in different ways, whether that be through more lightning strikes on trackside equipment or wet weather causing train detection failures. It may become necessary to incorporate means of proactively detecting such phenomena into the overall control system so that trains are prevented from running on compromised sections of track. Equally, the exponential increase in the number of electronic and digitally connected devices in proximity to railway operations presents such challenges as electromagnetic interference, a rising noise floor and radio reliability.
As train ridership continues to increase, passengers expect shorter waiting and journey times; Yet much of the ageing infrastructure is becoming increasingly unable to support the higher capacity. To prevent the rising passenger numbers from having a significant impact, traffic management systems will need to employ smarter strategies, like accounting for how people pass through stations and the area surrounding them. Another limiting factor is the dependency on train crew and station staff. Recovering after a disruption is driven by the availability of skilled and qualified personnel, the management of which is complicated by considerations such as logistics around where each person will end their shift and how many rostered hours they will have remaining.
Resilience to the changing industry will require people with knowledge on all the legacy systems in use, but also on the more recent and upcoming technologies of network systems, software, and safety electronics. Attracting young professionals into the industry through early career schemes such as apprenticeships and graduate schemes is necessary if the demographic issue of maintaining the railway while the older experts retire is to be solved. The experience and perspectives of people from other industries are also very relevant to maintaining resilience against new threats and seizing opportunities for innovation.
New technologies in the wider context of mobility, like automated road vehicles and mobility-as-a-service, will have an effect on the rail market and will necessitate understanding global changes such as evolving work patterns, remote diagnostics and other connected services. The use of digital twins at present seems to offer the best hope of modelling the world as it allows us to design for resilience in all its forms, raising the question of whether as an industry and as a country we are investing sufficiently in the right technology. We don’t have all the answers, but knowing we will be asked the question may well be the first step on this path.
Building A Resilient Railway Through Its Workforce
Prema Sharma, Siemens Mobility
Studied Electronic Engineering at University of Westminster, then joined Siemens Mobility as a Graduate Engineer in August 2017. As part of the graduate programme, I worked in R&D Interlocking, Systems Engineering and currently working in R&D Hardware.
PETERBOROUGH GROUND FRAME PANEL – A NOVEL DESIGN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
Shivani Singh, Atkins
Shivani is working in the Rail Industry with over 10 years of extensive signalling design experience on UK Mainline Railway signalling Network Rail projects.
At present based in the Bangalore and deploys these skills as Signalling Principles Designer / Verifier. She also has worked as a Assistant Project Manager for signalling projects.
Shivani is very enthusiastic and volunteer herself for Professional Institutions such as IET and IRSE. Shivani has successfully passed the IRSE Professional Examination with a credit in Module 1.
Shivani has authored this technical paper to share her experience one designing a novel technical solution by systematic approach for the benefit of the wider younger members team
Abstract:
Atkins’ Signalling Systems team in India had been delivering signalling detail designs for UK main line for over a decade. Recently the team has delivered designs for Peterborough Line Speed Increase Project. The main scope of this project was to upgrade tracks to improve the permissible line speed for trains near Peterborough station.
In the area of upgrade there was a mechanically operated ground frame (local control for sidings). The mechanical ground frame was assessed to be incompatible to the proposed upgrade and hence had to be decommissioned and replaced with a new Ground Frame Panel with power operated points.
This paper aims to describe the technical challenges associated with the mechanical ground frame renewals and the design solution proposed by the author using novel circuit design. The design solution produced by the author following a systematic approach to a novel design solution and ensures minimal interference to existing infrastructure.
This paper also aims to conclude with guidance for younger members on best practices for tackling such situations in the future projects.
Project Implementation
Crossrail Integration Facility and Test Automation – How an off-site fully automated testing facility increases resilience of complex signalling projects
Alessandra Scholl Sternberg, Siemens UK
I am a Systems Engineer at Siemens Mobility Limited (Chippenham-UK), working mainly in test automation in the Crossrail Integration Facility. I studied Engineering Physics in the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and a year of Mechatronics and Robotics Engineering in the University of Sheffield through a sponsored study abroad programme. I joined Siemens in 2016 as a Graduate Engineer and got more interested in the railway after getting an overview of it from working in distinct departments such as Bids and Tendering, R&D and Systems Engineering. Besides work, I volunteer for STEM events and Equality, Diversity and Inclusivity related events, especially regarding Women in Engineering.
Abstract:
Today’s urban rail transport networks are an essential instrument for large metropolitan areas in coping with the growing demand for punctual, reliable and environment-friendly transport services. Alstom’s solution to address that need is its Urbalis® communication-based train control system.
Resilience is the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; in this context, it is the ability for the system to continue to perform its transport function, or to return quickly to nominal operation, after disturbances caused by unforeseen situations. The situations Urbalis® is designed to deal with are of three types: 1) hardware and software failures or degradations; 2) disruptions resulting from external perturbations, including passenger usage; 3) malevolent attacks.
To deal with hardware and software failures, Urbalis® relies on highly redundant architectures, in particular that of the data communication system which is its backbone, but also on the use of innovative maintenance and asset management strategies; in particular, predictive maintenance, supported by the HealthHub™ platform, aims at detecting degradations before they result in service-affecting failures.
Why Brownfield Re-signalling Projects always require a Transition State
Nick Terry, The Shard Group Pty Ltd
I am a professional railway signalling engineering consultant providing advice to governments, infrastructure owners, and operators in respect of the introduction of modern communication-based train control strategies including both CBTC and ETCS.
Having commenced work as an S&T engineering management trainee with British Rail, I have worked in the UK, Portugal and, for the last 12 years, Australia.
I am the Director of The Shard Group Pty Ltd which is a small consultancy delivering such services within a group of engineering and systems management staff.
I am a Fellow of the IRSE, a member of the IET, and a Registered Professional Engineer of Queensland.
Abstract:
Why Brownfield Re-signalling Projects always require a Transition State. This paper concerns the process of changing the train control system on an operating railway (a brownfield resignalling project) whilst maintaining resilience during the difficult period of change (the transition period). The overall objective of a resignalling project is to change from the existing operating state to a new operating state in order to realise safety and/or business benefits. Making the whole of the change in one step overnight is not feasible on an operating railway. Whilst it may be practicable to replace the whole of the signalling technology over one weekend, it is not feasible to make major changes to multiple staff working practices, safe operating procedures and rail timetables over that same weekend. The risk of failure would be too high, both in consequence and probability, and a fallback state is not available if only part of the transformation is successful. This leads to a step-wise approach to the change, passing through one or more ‘transition’ states.
Train control solutions require signalling and telecommunication products, application engineering of those products (adaptation), and people to interact with the technology. In this context, the key people include train drivers, network controllers, maintainers, and operations managers. Any resignalling solution needs to consider all three layers. The challenges with and within each layer are different. The paper considers the effects on each of these three layers.
Conventional resignalling projects have always traditionally included a transition state. This would typically involve new signals being erected in advance of the changeover weekend and covered with a hood and a white cross. This is considered a change of infrastructure to the train drivers, so they would be advised of the presence of non-commissioned signals via special operating notices.
As signalling technology has moved onto the train, the changes required when replacing signalling technology have become more complicated. The number of players interacting with the signalling system has increased, and the commercial arrangements between those players has become more complex. The result of this is that the ability to change the whole system over one weekend has diminished.
There are only two solutions to this challenge: one solution is to introduce a significant closure of the whole system (typically three months or more); the alternative is to break the change into a number of steps, each of which is manageable over a weekend. This introduces temporary operating states (Transition Stages) between the current state and the final state, but reduces the overall transition risk.
This paper explains in further detail the need for such Transition States, and provides examples of situations in which their deployment increases project resilience and reduces project risk. It recommends that the use of Transition States is embraced, rather than just being accepted as an adequate last resort.
Digitalisation and Maintenance
Oh Cyber Security doesn’t affect me…right? Systems Integration and Cyber Security
Colin Alonzo Hamilton Williams, SNC-Lavalin UK
I am the Head of Control Systems Integration in the Rail Control Systems practice in SNC-Lavalin UK. My team and I specialize in delivering Systems Integration expertise across Transportation sector in order to help deliver complex multi-disciplinary projects. I have been in the rail industry for around 10 years during which time I’ve become a Chartered Engineer and a Certified Systems Engineering Profession. In that time I have had the privilege to have worked on some of the leading projects in the UK and abroad ranging from small ad-hoc modifications to big P3 design and build mega projects.
Abstract:
We have come to expect more and more functionality from our devices, our offices and even our homes. This functionality requires data and connections but with this connectivity comes vulnerability and a need for cyber security. Through effective Systems Integration and design, linked with cyber security, we can drive the overall solution and lead to a safer, more secure, and integrated solution.
From Data to Diagnosis: Point condition monitoring through machine learning
Richard Parkinson, Balfour Betty
Richard Parkinson works as a condition monitoring engineer at Omnicom Balfour Beatty. He specialises in applying data analysis and machine learning to predict and prevent failures in point machines and level crossings. Over the last year he has worked in a team that has produced a state of the art system to guide and assist efficient and effective maintenance.
Previously, Richard worked at Eversholt Rail. While there he carried out a study of Automated Visual Inspection Systems, exploring their potential and financial viability.
Richard studied General Engineering at Cambridge University specialising in electronics, control system and signal processing. He enjoys playing the organ in his spare time and for his masters modelled organ pipe transients using Linear Gaussian Models.
Abstract:
We live in an age where we can collect and store huge amounts of data about anything we want to monitor. A railway infrastructure network could easily have thousands of point machines each moving many times a day, potentially creating an overwhelming amount of data. The challenge is in using this to answer to a few important questions:
Which machines need attention and when?
What are the issues?
How well were they maintained?
In this presentation, key steps in turning that data into meaningful, high-level answers are explored. Capturing the right data:What affects point machine condition? Some factors can be measured directly such as temperature variation, vibration and track movement. Others must be measured indirectly like machine wear, damage, set up and quality of maintenance. Indirect factors can be monitored through the dynamics, stresses and electrical characteristics of the machine. All these measurement techniques come with challenges such as safety risks, a harsh railway environment, cost, location and the maintenance regime. Current and voltage monitoring are the most popular as they are simple, safe and inexpensive. Looking at several types of point machine, I will explore what level of data quality is appropriate, how they relate to position and stress, and their limitations in providing a complete picture of the asset condition.Linking the data to the electro-mechanics of the machine:Most point machines follow a standardised sequence of operation consisting of unlock, traverse and lock. These sections can vary dramatically in both the magnitude and shape within the power profile. Segmenting the data allows component operation to be isolated for accurate analysis.Machine learning can be used to identify these sections robustly and consistently with no human guidance. Defining machine condition:Once the point move has been segmented, metadata can be derived to quantify the machine state. Condition or 'health' can then be calculated to determine the immediacy of response required and to prioritise maintenance.Machine learning can be trained using historic data to identify these different health states.Identifying the causes of poor condition:
There are various ways the causes of potential failures can be spotted.
Unusual behaviour can be related to the mechanics, indicating where to inspect first.
Templates can be created by applying faults to machines under test conditions and recording their characteristics.
Lessons learned from past maintenance can guide how to fix problems.
These methods can be used to increase the effectiveness and reduce the frequency of maintenance.Communicating the diagnosis:It is important to provide clear and relevant information to all stakeholders. A front line maintenance team needs to know the identified issues and how effectively they solved them; a maintenance manager needs the information to be able to prioritise maintenance and scheduled in future intervention; and a senior manager would like to know KPIs of the overall network system state. We have developed a system, built upon machine learning and data analysis, tailored to provide answers to the questions in the introduction.
Modelling and Modernisation
Taking a Legacy Interlocking to the Era of IoT
Bob Janssen, Siemens Netherlands
In 1989 I graduated from TU Delft with an engineering degree in geodesy. After military service, I did a PhD at Strasbourg University in France in geophysics, focusing on numerical modelling of plate tectonics. After that I moved to Leeds for a post-doc in marine geophysics.My career in the rail industry started in earnest in 1998 in Stuttgart and Berlin with Alcatel, later Thales, developing ETCS onboard units in a joint venture with Siemens. In 2001, i joined Matra in Paris, developing Moving Block CBTC systems using formal methods. When Siemens bought the business I got the opportunity to pursue my career, after a short intermezzo in Braunschweig, on-site testing and debugging the ETCS Level 2 systems on HSL Zuid in the Low Countries. I staid in the Netherlands and joined Siemens NL supporting sales of signalling and ETCS systems. In a later, parallel, development I contributed my knowledge of European signalling systems towards developing an interlocking schema for railML. Since early 2018, I've been contributing to the EULYNX data preparation cluster, an effort to create a European standards for data exchange between signalling industry and infrastructure managers. I'm married and have two teen-age daughters.
Abstract:
Early electronic interlocking systems were designed according to 1980’s state of the art in information technology. Accessing diagnostic data to look under the bonnet of the interlocking would be cumbersome. Today’s “Internet of Things” premise is to expose state data of sensor-equipped objects in the field. This paper explains how one can make a 1990’s interlocking look like an IoT system. Authorised users can select and observe live state data from objects controlled by the interlocking, in IoT style. What’s more, one can create a “digital mirror” of the interlocking system by providing rich data that represent both static configuration data and dynamic state data of the running system.
Victoria Line – 50 Years Of Resilience (So Far)
Conor O'Flaherty, Siemens Mobility Limited
I am a Bid Engineer working within the Bids & Tendering department at Siemens Mobility to support the submission of winning bids with cost-effective system architectures and implementation methodologies. I have three years experience in the UK signalling industry and am interested in using new technologies and ideas to deliver the best possible experience to the travelling public.
Abstract:
When London Underground’s Victoria Line opened in 1968 it was seen as a space-age transport solution, with a fleet of sleek silver trains, and ‘computers’ driving each train from station to station safely, smoothly, reliably. 50 years later, the Victoria Line is still a world leader in terms of performance and reliability, with the highest service frequency of any line in London. With 15 of the 16 stations being interchanges, the railway is a major artery, and its resilience is critical to London’s smooth running.
The cameras rolled when Queen Elizabeth officially opened the line and again upon completion in 1971, but then the publicity stopped! From 1971 to 2009 the ‘Vic Line’ rarely hit the headlines, it just worked. Significant effort was invested in keeping the 1960s technology working, for example the autodriver boxes were changed twice. Obsolescence became an issue, but the dedicated and skilled staff kept the railway running.
In the early 21st Century London Underground, Siemens and Bombardier worked together to upgrade the signalling and control systems as a new train fleet was introduced. The teams implemented a staged migration, overlaying the new system on top of the 1960s equipment, allowing old trains to use the old system and new trains to use new technology until the completion of fleet replacement.
The team created an integration rig that allowed full off-site testing of train carried and trackside systems. Lessons learnt in assembling the integration rigs were carried through into installing equipment in the constrained spaces available without impacting existing systems. Extensive systems engineering was built into the project, along with approaches like ‘testing to destruction’ of subsystems and software elements. The system was designed for availability, and reliability growth was monitored closely.
Since the successful upgrade in 2012 further investment has seen the performance of the system increase again with the VLU2 programme allowing the current 36tph timetable to be introduced. Timetable delivery depends on the automatic train regulation system element of the control centre to exploit built-in resilience, automatically responding to minor service disruption, and providing control technology to allow operators to recover from major service perturbation quickly and safely. Accurate, timely information is provided to passengers, and the complex line/station management systems allow optimum operation. This is particularly relevant with 39 trains in service and only 32 platforms since any service disruption will cause trains to stop between stations.
What the next 50 years will bring for the Victoria Line remains to be seen. There are aspirations for further increases to capacity, with barriers to this increase related to moving people through stations rather than simply running more trains. Cybersecurity of the network needs to be maintained, and emerging challenges identified and dealt with. Maintaining the operation of the railway in the future will require further development of the already highly functional condition monitoring and management systems, and a continuing commitment to obsolescence management to ensure that the Victoria Line is still resilient and World Class in 2068.
What Building a Tangible Model Taught Me About the Real Railway
Aaron Sawyer, co-author, SNC Lavalin
Alexander Romanovsky is a professor in computing science with Newcastle University, United Kingdom. His main research interests are system dependability, fault tolerance, safety, modelling and vAaron joined SNC-Lavalin in 2017, as a consultant he has applied both technical and project management practices to a vast array of projects. Within the rail industry, Aaron has rapidly gained experience assessing the UK signalling market and the growing demand for increased interoperability, conducting detailed technical investigations of system failures, providing safety assurance evidence for the Northen Line Extension and proactively driving the delivery of a model signalling system and associated railway.
Aaron is currently working towards becoming a Chartered Engineer and is preparing to sit his IRSE Professional Examinations in October 2019.
Abstract:
With the growing demand for air travel and the increased traffic through Heathrow's Terminal 5 (T5), it is no surprise the airport is looking to improve capacity and reduce the likelihood of overcrowding. Just as many international airports deploy Automated People Movers (APMs), Heathrow owns and operates Bombardier's APM 200 vehicles, and serve as the main passenger transportation medium between T5A and its sub-terminal stations T5B and T5C. In order to maximise capacity, operational changes were proposed which would see the current shuttle service upgraded to a loop service allowing for the simultaneous running of more vehicles.Whilst upgrading the system to operate in a loop reduces wait times, platform congestion and reliability issues, it also introduces change to the system and the need to create resilience: to inform stakeholders allowing for the successful completion of the operational upgrades; and to ensure the capacity to recover quickly from varying and new operational situations. Within this paper I shall discuss how SNC-Lavalin and Heathrow Airport partnered and through the use a Raspberry Pi, a few Arduinos and other readily available commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components created an operational N-scale model railway, complete with a fully fledged signalling system, all in aid to assist operational integration and create resilience. The model was designed and coded to closely follow the architecture of the real system; at the heart of the system a Raspberry Pi forms the control centre that hosts separate modules, executing the interlocking, the Regional ATC and the ATO functionality. The trackside components (lineside signals, switches and Hall Effect sensors - to facilitate train detection) are controlled by two Zone Controllers that run on Arduino MEGA microcontrollers which, along with the Vehicle Control Centre, communicate with the control centre via an Ethernet switch at the network layer. Producing the operational model aimed to allow operators to simulate and run a variety of scenarios to test the functionality of the system, especially those relating to degraded modes of operation. However, even prior to the training of operational staff, the model was creating resilience during the delivery of the project. It enabled stakeholders to play-out alternative scenarios, discover and understand the operational upgrade. In addition the model acts as a tool to inspire and fuel the creativity of future engineers. The model's Human Machine Interface features a graphical representation of the system, making it the ideal platform for developing engineers to first try out their signalling routines before trialing them on the real model. I'll close the paper by detailing what building a model has taught me about building real railways, some of which will include:
how to increase stakeholder engagement and understanding;
greater architectural understanding of signalling systems;•how engineering teachings have changed across generations and how we all can benefit; and
how, through the use of COTS components alone, an operationally similar model can be produce to that of a real railway.
Well, with the exception of some very "snazzy" 3D printed Bombardier APM 200 body shells, but you'll have to excuse us for the extra glitz.
Basic study on a train control system integrating operational control and safety control
Yoichi Sugiyama, Railway Technical Research Institute
Born in March, 1980, Graduated from graduate school of information science and technology of Osaka Univ., Japan. April 2004,Joined Railway Technical Research Institute, Japan. To September 2011, researcher of passenger information systems laboratory. From October 2011 to September 2013, I participated in the “Railway Information Technology Project Team” of West Japan Railway Company. From October 2013 to present, as an assistant senior researcher of train control systems laboratory, I was responsible for studying read performance of RFID tags. Also I participated in the “Design of Train Control System using Radio Transmission Network”.
Abstract:
By recognizing the operation status of all trains in real time through the information network and recalculating the operation plan of each train according to the situation, it is possible to restore operation early in the case of operation disturbance, and to shorten the headway. Therefore, a more flexible and safe train operation can be expected.In the current system, functions of train control and operation management are almost independently advanced (i.e. train position is for each track circuit, and timetable merely consists of departure and arrival times), and since the discrete value of information is handled, realization of flexible transportation is restricted.We propose a new operation control system that integrates the function of operation management, which actively utilizes the features of the wireless train control system. In the system proposed, a driving curve is drawn on a new type of timetable "control map" consisting of combination of precise train positions and detailed passage time at any locations, and trains, turnouts, level crossings etc. are controlled according to plan.In this system, centralized operation control device that integrates both the functions of operation management and the safety control manages the control map. By sending control instructions along the operation curve created by the operation control device to on-board devices or the ground devices, it is possible to precisely control trains, turnouts etc. Also, by periodically gathering the information about position and speed of the train and about state of the facilities from each device, accurate operation management can be performed by the operation control device. In order to realize this system, it is necessary not only to secure its safety but also to verify its feasibility and availability in network performance.(1) Regarding the safety, we designed principles on headway control and route control, and conducted safety assessment with FTA and FMEA to verify the validity of the basic design.(2) As for the feasibility of the network performance, we determined the system configuration corresponding to the model line, and demonstrated the network performance by the network simulator "TCNET" developed by RTRI. Then we confirmed that there are no bottlenecks.(3) With respect to the availability, conditions are set for not only the device composition but also the internal composition of the operation control device. By calculating the system availability according to these conditions, we confirmed the feasible composition.(4) As it was possible to establish the feasible control and composition of the system proposed, through (1) to (3), in order to understand the basic operation of the system proposed, a control method was implemented on the simulator. As for the function of ensuring safety, we demonstrated with the simulator that the train can be stopped in cases where something wrong occurs. We also demonstrated that foreseeing control can be performed to shorten the headway between the preceding train departing from the station and the following train approaching the station in order to confirm the function of improving convenience.In this paper, we describe abovementioned four items of verification.
Opmerkingen